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Abstract of
Shipping Conferences: Their Future in the Face of Political
and Technological Change
Shipping conferences developed more than a century ago because a means
was required to regulate the intense competition in the international shipping
industry. This competition, which is natural, was intensified because of tech-
no logical inovation, high capital investment, and overtonnage
This study is undertaken to show, through a discussion of the development
of conferences, tools available for their use, and current political and tech-
no logical environment in which they operate, that similar conditions still exist,
and although the nature of the shipping industry has been experiencing major
changes in technology and operations, the conference system still offers a viable
forum for negotiating, compromising, and regulating in an important transport-
ation industry.
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CHAPTER I
The Development of the Shipping Conference System
The liner shipping industry is made up of competing shipping interests
from allover the world. Competition between these parties, in the areas of
quality of service, speed of delivery, treatment of shippers, and rates charg-
ed, can be quite intense. No single government has been able to regulate how
these shipping companies operate (although the U.S. has tried to do so on its
own trade routes) because of the international nature of the industry. The
industry began to develop a system, more than a hundred years ago, which
could provide this regulatory function. This system, the conference system,
would also provide some stability in rate and schedule making, and provide
an organization which could collectively negotiate with cargo shippers and
compete with non-conference vessels. In order to understand the nature and
the future prospects of this shipping conference system, an understanding
of why the conferences first developed is required.
Liners, or common carriers, are concerned primarily with the carriage of
general cargo on regularly scheduled routes. This general cargo is merchandise
which is often higher in unit cost than the bulkier goods carried by tramp steam-
ers. These goods can be finished or semi-finished products such as watches,
televisions, or calculators. The expens~ve nature of the general cargo has
made the shippers of the goods increasingly concerned with the length of time
it takes to transport from the manufacturer to the consumer. High premiums paid
to ~n5ure these packages, interest paid to financiers, and funds that are locked
up in inventory during transit drive this concern. The more costly the item, the
faster the producers desired delivery. Speed of ships, therefore, is an im-
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portant factor to be considered by the shipper when choosing carriers. These
concerns were as important in the days of sail as they are today.
The liner shipping company, with its numerous vessels and rigid schedules,
requires a large shore establishment to handle maintenance, legal work,
arrange bunkering, and arrange for cargo to be carried. The complex
organization responsible for managing these functions are fixed costs, as
it costs the shipowner to operate this portion of the liner company even
when no cargo is being transported. Numerous vessels are required of a
liner company in order to adhere to the rigid, regular, sailing schedules.
These vessels must sail no matter how full or empty they are. A liner company
then is faced with high mortgage payments on numerous vessels, high over-
head costs for a large shore establishment, and are forced (if the company
wishes to remain in the liner business) to sail vessels whether they
carry enough cargo to cover their costs or not. These economic stresses add
to the competitive nature of the liner industry.
During the mid 19th century, steam powered vessels began to appear on
the world trade routes. These vessels were frequently faster than the sailing
vessels already on the routes and certainly more predictable with regard to est-
imated time of arrival, since the steam vessels did not have to rely on the wind
as their mode of propulsion. In addition, in 1869 the Suez Canal opened, and
offered a much shorter route from the Indian Ocean to Europe. This route gave
the steam ship another advantage over sail because the steam powered vessels
did not have to deal with the unfavorable wind conditions in the Red Sea and
the canal.
The advantage of steam vessels over sailing vessels became readily ap-
parent to ship owners, and as new ships were constructed, an increasing number
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were powered by steam. In the United Kingdom alone, the registered tonnage for
steamships increased more than 600 percent in the twenty year period from
1860 to 1880 (from 450,000 tons to 2,720,000 tons).l With this major increase
in tonnage, however, did not come a similar increase in available cargo. This
created an overtonnage situation, where more cargo carrying space was available
than there was cargo to fill it. As competition for the cargo increased, com-
peting liner companies began to cut prices. In order for a liner shipping
company to stay solvent, at least the variable costs of operating the ships had
to be met. As one company cut their rates, so did a rival. This began the danger-
ous downward spiral of rates which, when left unchecked will eventually fall
below the minimum compensatory levels. This forced some companies to combine,
and others to go under. 2
As an awareness to the destructiveness of unbridled competition arose, so
did the desire to find a means to control it. Through the mid 19th century
various attempts were made within the industry to stablize these conditions.
In the early 1870's some real progress was finally made. The Peninsular and
Oriental Steam Navigation Company, the British India Company, the T.& J.
Harrison Company, and other liner companies operating on the London to Calcutta
trade route, met to stablize the shipping market by agreeing upon uniform
freight rate and terms of carriage. 3 The agreement drafted had two major pro-
visions: first, to charge equal freight rates for similar commodities being
shipped from each British port to Calcutta; and second, that no preferential
treatment would be conceded to shippers as was frequently done in the past. 4
This agreement is known as the Calcutta Conference of 1875.
The shippers' response to this was less than positive. They liked the
preferential treatment they had been receiving from the shipowners, and the
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uncontrolled rate wars often gave the shippers the best bargaining position.
In order to break this consortium, the shippers patronized the non-conference
steamers operating on the trade route. The shipowners' response was an attempt
to negotiate with the shippers by offering lower rates if coupled to exclusive
support contracts. This provided some relief, but without the preferential
treatment, the larger shippers refused to take part. In 1877, a negotiating
tool was devised that satisfied both the conference shipowners and the ship-
pers--a "deferred rebate", a promised partial refund of rates paid, returned
after a period of "loyalty" had elapsed. 5
With many trade routes being steamed by liner companies that had consider-
able amounts of capital at risk in the rate war yexed trade, the conference
system was seen as an attractive way to stablize the situation. The number of
parties involved in the liner trade was reduced since the rate wars forced
some companies out of the industry, the amount of capital required often forc-
ed conglomeration, and as a natural result of other causes that stimulate
mergers. This permitted the negotiations required to form a conference agree-
ment to run smoother and the results to be tighter. The conference system was
implemented first in the British shipping industry and then spread to the other
European maritime nations and finally the rest of the industrialized world.
Today, shipping conferences are found operating on almost every trade route,
and as of 1976, 360 conferences were in operation. 6
What caused the shipping conference system to develope can be summarized
in four points: First, technological developments were made which the ship-
ping industry quickly put into use; in particular, steam propulsion and the
Suez Canal. Second, shipping companies overzealously invested in this new type
of ship, creating an over tonnage situation. Third, considerable capital invest-
4
ment by shipping companies in these new ships, coupled with the overtonnage,
created a fiercely and sometimes destructively, competitive market. Finally,
no single government could claim, or enforce, jurisdiction over the liner ship-
ping industry due to its international nature.
5
CHAPTER II
Conference Tools for Controlling Competition
Conferences are voluntary associations of liner carriers operating on a
particular trade route. As seen in Chapter I, their purpose is to regulate
competition among members of the conference, respond to competition by
"independen e' liner companies J and negot iate with shipper organizations. 1
There are seven basic tools, or techniques available to the members of
shipping conferences to affect this control: 1.Rate agreements; 2.5ailing
schedule agreements; 3.Poo1ing agreements; 4. "Good faith" or performance
bonds; 5.External agreements; 6.Fighting ships; and 7.Tying arrangementa.
An understanding of these methods is important to the understanding of
shipping conferences.
Rate Agreements: Rate agreements appear in three forms--fixed rates,minimum
rates, and differential rates. With a "fixed rate" agreement, the conference
members agree on the rate that should be charged for a particular commodity
on that route. Any changes to this rate must be made by mutual concent
of the conference members. A "minimum rate" agreement sets the lowest
rate allowed for a given commodity. Higher rates are at the discretion
of the individual shipper. Both the fixed rate and minimum rate agreements
are effective in limiting competietition by setting the lower end of !he
rate range, at least at a level where the conference ship is adequately
compensated.
The third form of rate agreement, the "differential rate" agreement, pro-
vides the slower, more indirect, or inferior in service liner companies a means
by which to stay competitive and remain in the conference. Those lines permitted
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to use the differential rate may charge 5 to 10 percent less than the fixed or
minimum rate in order to attract customers. This form of agreement is com-
monly used in the passenger liner trade where accommodations and services vary
greatly.
Sailing Schedule Agreements: Agreements on sailing schedules attempt to elim-
inate the problem of stacking of the ships in a port, which could lead to dest-
ructive competition in contracting for a finite amount of cargo. These agree-
ments take on various appearances. The simplest form of agreement spreads out
sailing dates, thus reducing the number of competing ships for a particular load
of cargo. Other agreements restrict which ports members of the conference
may work, or the number of runs to a specific port an individual line may make
each year.
Pooling Arrangements: Pooling arrangements are agreements to share the com-
merce available on a given trade route. This can be done in three ways: agree-
ments to share the available traffic, agreements to share the gross income
from passenger or freight fares, and agreements to share the net earnings from
freight fares.
Good Faith or Performance Bonds: Performance bonds require a member of a con-
ference to deposit, with the conference, a sum of money to guarantee their comp-
liance to conference rules. If a member shipping line is found to be in vio-
lation of the conference agreement, e.g. charging a lower freight rate than
the minimum rate agreed upon, a fine would be imposed and taken from the liner's
deposit. A major break or violation could result in complete forfeiture of
their deposit.
External Agreements: External agreements are used to minimize competitive
problems with tramp shipping companies, non-conference shipping companies, and
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competing trade routes. These negotiations usually attempt to equalize rates,
or stablize a rate war situation by settling on a rate differential.
Fighting Ships: A fighting ship is a vessel used on a particular trade route
by a shipping conference to force a non-member competitor off the trade route.
The fighting ship, berthed in the disputed port, will sail on the same day, or
a pair of fighting ships might sail on strattling days, for the same port of
destination as the competitor. The rates charged would be equal to or less
than the rates charged by the target competitor. These actions would reduce the
cargo available for the competitor to such an extent, that it would become
unfeasable for the competitor to remain on that trade route. While the fight-
ing ship itself may be operating at a loss, the conference members would
share that loss, and the amount absorbed by each member would be mimimal.
The use of fighting ships is considered illegal under U.S.law2 and under the
UNCTAD Liner Code. 3
Probably the most notorious use of fighting ships was the Syndikats-
Rhederei, a shipping company formed and owned by six large Hamburg steamship
lines (Hamburg-American Line, Hamburg-South American Line, German Steamship
company, German-Australian Steamship Company, C. Woermann, and German East
Africa Company).4 These six lines purchased small, inexpensive vessels to be
used as fighting ships by their lines, and when not used for this purpose they
were used as normal charter vessels.
Tying Arrangements: Tying arrangements include deferred rebates and various
contract types, all of which attempt to guarantee availability of goods for
shipment to a carrier, or group of shippers. The deferred rebate is basically
a refund of charges, refunded after a specified period of exclusive loyalty.
More specifically, a shipper who ships its product exclusively with members
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of a conference for a rebate period (usually 3,6,or 12 months) will receive
a rebate on that period's charges (usually 5 to 10 percent), if the shipper
continues to ship exclusively with that conference through another rebate per-
iod. The use of the deferred rebate by a carrier strongly ties a shipper to
it, as few shippers are willing to loose two periods' worth of rebate by ship-
ping with another carrier. 5
Carriers can also bind shippers to them by the use of preferential con-
tracts and exclusive patronage contracts (also known as dual rate contracts).
The preferential contract is the oldest of these contracts and provides
large shippers with rates lower than those generally quoted. These
contracts also require either exclusive patronage or a specified minimum
volume of business. The exclusive patronage contract, on the other hand,
is available to both large and small shippers, and provides lower rates
for shippers who ship exclusively with the conference for a given contract
period, often one year. During the contract period the shipper would pay
a lower rate than non-contract shippers. Under the Shipping Act of 1984,
a third form of contract has been allowed on the U.S. trade routes, the
service contract. In this form of contract a shipper commits to provide
a minimum cargo within a specified time period, while the carrier commits
to a rate schedule for the cargo and other specific service guarantees. 6
The terms of this contract must be made available to all shippers under
similar circumstances~
The seven methods mentioned above can be used to effectively control oper-
ations on a trade route. The first four methods tend to control competition
internal to a conference, while the remaining methods attempt to control the
9
activities of others. Not all of these techniques are universally used, and
some, like fighting ships, are illegal on some routes.
10
CHAPTER III
Investigations into Conference Operations
Charges of unfair business tactics and monopolism have been called against
conferences since their inception in the mid 19th century. These charges had
been frequent and serious enough that the governments of the United States and
the United Kingdom have conducted official investigations into their operations.
During the last half of the nineteenth century, rate wars, intensified by
technological advances, high capital investment and over tonnage , continued to plague
the liner industry. This intense competition, and other economic incentives that
stimulate the growth of businesses into larger and larger interests, forced some
businesses to amalgamate or merge, and others to leave the business altogether.
With the number of competing interests thinning out, the conference negotiations
became less difficult and the resultant agreements became tighter and easier to
enforce. With the conferences becoming tighter and stronger, many questioned
whether they were becoming too powerful and were perhaps extorting higher freight
rates and other unfair terms from the shippers.
Investigations in the United Kingdom
By the late 1800's, serious complaints began to be registered in the United
Kingdom and its Commonwealth nations, concerning the trade practices of the conf-
erences. In 1899, the British Iron Trade Association registered complaints to
the Board of Trade against the unfair use by the conference liners of differential
rates. Complaints of the unfair use of deferred rebates were made by the repre-
sentatives of the South African colonies in 1904. At the same time, in New Zealand
and Australia, complaints about the use of deferred rebate sparked an investigation
into their use. In 1906, both the Australian Royal Commission and the Congress
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of the Chambers of Commerce of the Empire found that the use of the deferred
rebate tool was injurious to the trade of the Kingdom, and the Australian
Royal Commission went so far as to recommend that its use be outlawed. l The com-
plaints against the conference system became so frequent and serious throughout
the empire that in 1906 the government in London appointed the Royal Commission
on Shipping Rings to investigate conference operations. In 1909 the Commission
reported its findings.
Results of the Royal Commission on Shipping Rings: The Royal Commission went to
great lengths to hear all sides of the shipping conference story. At the hearings,
shippers, conference liners, and independent lines from allover the Empire were
represented. The Commission considered the different competition structures
represented on different trade routes. They found the conference system used on
almost all trade routes and that the deferred rebate system was present in almost
trades. Because of the disparity in views presented to the Commission between the
parties in the U.K. and those from the colonies, the Commission was unable to come
to a unanimous position regarding conferences. As a result, two reports were
delivered in 1909: the Majority Report with eleven signatures, and the Minority
Report with five signatures.
The Majority Report stated that there were many advantages to the conference
system and the deferred rebate system. In response to the charges of monopoly, the
report stated that the following factors limited the conferences' use of that
monopolistic power: First, new liner companies and tramp ships provided enough
competition to keep the conferences in check. Second, competition exists within
the conference due to differences in service and facilities offered to shippers.
Third, monopolistic power was kept in check by collective action taken by shippers. 2
The Majority Report made four major recommendations: First, conferences using
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deferred rebates as a tying arrangement to shippers should file with the Board of
Trade all conferences agreements, external understandings, rebate circulars, claim
forms, and agreements with shipper associations. Second, conferences should be
require to file with the Board all tariffs and must publish them for public
inspection. Third, collective bargaining, on behalf of the shippers, should be
used to hold in check the conferences' use of monopolistic powers. Fourth, the
Board should be given power to conduct investigations into conference operation
where national interest might be affected. 3
The dissenters, in the Minority Report, stated that they believed the advantages
to the deferred rebate system were not as great as the Majority Report suggested.
They made the following recommendations: First, that consultation and conciliation
be strongly supported with regards to rate setting and service provisions. Second,
that the Board of Trade be allowed to investigate shipping matters where not just
the national interest is involved, but when consumer's and producer's interests
were. Third, that the Board make a yearly report to Parliament regarding their
investigations and finding pertaining to shipping conferences. Their last
recommendations agreed with the Majority Report: tariffs should be published, and
no major legislative action was required.
The Royal Commission concluded that the conference system was a legitimate
response to unrestricted competition in the liner shipping business. Regulation
was considered necessary, and self regulation through the conferences was the
industry's response. No legislative action was implemented as a result of this
inv~stigation.4
Investigations in the United States
In the United States, dissatisfaction with the growing power of the shipping
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lines was not uncommon among shippers. With the passage of the Sherman Anti-Trust
Act of 1890 and later the Clayton Act of 1914, the shippers and courts had legal
grounds for vocalizing their complaints. 5 In 1911, the U.S. Department of Justice
brought suit against Hamburg-America Line, et aI, the Prince Line, et aI, and the
American Asiatic Steamship Company, et aI, alleging violation of the anti-trust
laws in their use of deferred rebates. 6 The case went all the way through the
judicial process, but did not reach the Supreme Court until after World War I had
begun. By that time, due to circumstances csused by the war, the practices origin-
ally complained of had ceased. Thus, the Supreme Court found the matter moot and
rendered no decision.
While the three anti-trust cases were still being fought in the court system,
the U.S. House of Representatives decided that it should look into conference
operations as well. This task was given to the House Committee on Merchant Marine
and Fisheries. The investigating committee, headed by Joshua W. Alexander, Chairmsn
of the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, began its inquiries in 1912 and
completed its report in 1914. The result of this investigation had a significant
impact on the U.S. legislation involved with conferences.
The Alexander Committee Report: The Alexander Committee investigated conference
operations on the U.S. trade routes in response to many complaints of actions by
the shipping conferences. In pursuing this investigation, the committee utilized
data supplied by the U.S. diplomatic services, the Royal Commission's reports, the
Department of Justice, and data collected through public hearings. From the diplo-
matic services, reports were received addressing U.S.-involved shipping operations
in their area of jurisdiction. The Department of Justice gave the Committee access
to pertinent testimony and exhibits from pending cases resulting from alleged anti-
trust law violations. The findings of the Committee, as reported in 1914, were
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similar to the findings of the Royal Commission. In fact, they found that "practic-
ally all the lines serving both the Atlantic and Pacific seaboards of the United
States are members of conferences, or work in cooperation through written agreement
or oral under standings.,,7 Where there was no agreement, the liner industry tended
to follow rates and schedules offered by the dominant carrier on the trade route.
In general, the committee found that the conferences did provide a stablizing
effect by allowing cooperation on freight rates and schedules. The Committee
believed, however, that control over monopolistic tendencies that the combinations
were capable of affecting, could only be accomplished by effective governmental
control.
The Committee made several recommendations regarding regulation of shipping
combinations. That the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) should have jurisdic-
tion over shipping rates, regulation, and contracts, including investigative powers.
All agreements, understandings, and conference arrangements would have to be filed
with the ICC. The ICC would also be given power to cancel any agreement, or part
thereof, which it found to be discriminatory, unfair or detrimental to the commerce
of the United States. More specifically, the committee recommended that deferred
rebates, fighting ships, and retaliation, be made illegal on all U.S. trade routes.
Two years later, the Shipping Act of 1916 was passed. This act, with the
amendments of 1961, was the basic statute regulating commercial shipping operations
in the U.S. trades until 1984. In the 1916 Act, liner conferences agreements were
recognized to be legal, but only if certain guidelines for operation were followed.
Deferred rebates, fighting ships, and retaliation for "disloyalty" or other unfair
treatment of shippers were made illegal, and dual rate contracts were made legal. 8
Responsibility to enforce these rules, and to control the monopolistic power wielded
by combinations, was placed in the hands of a Shipping Board (now the Federal
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Maritime Commission--FMC). In order to facilitate control of this, all rates,
charges, and agreements between carriers were required to be filed with the FMC.9
The FMC had the power to approve or disapprove, in whole or in part, rates or
agreements filed. The importance of this point was, if the agreement was ap-
proved, the agreement became exempt from prosecution under the Sherman Anti-Trust
Act and other anti-trust laws. 10
The Royal Commission on Shipping Rings and the Alexander Committee were the
two landmark investigations concerning shipping conference operations to date.
Other investigations have been made, notably the Merchant Marine and Fisheries
Committee's investigation in the early 1960's and the Imperial Shipping Committee
in the '20's and '30's. Through all these investigations and hearings, some
salient advantages and disadvantages of the shipping conference system can be
noted. As was desired of the first successful conference, the Calcutta
Conference, the system did offer greater stability to rates and sailing
schedules. These agreements to stablize rates and schedules provided relief
from the wasteful competition often found on the highly competative trade routes.
The organization into conferences offered other benefits to the members as well.
By combining into these trade associations, shipowners were provided a vehicle
through which agreements to rationalize shipping on a trade route (i.e. agree
to provide only the combined tonnage necessary to support the routes trade)
could be made. In response to shipowners need for modernization of their
vessels, the associations could also provide the capital required.
The disadvantages to the shipping conference system must also be consid-
ered. One of the most frequently stated complaints against conferences
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is that the shipowners, combining into large business organizations,
develop a monopolistic control over a trade route. With this monopolistic
power, they are capable of charging excessively high rates, and change
those rates with out adequate responsiveness to shippers. Economists have
noted that the minimum rates charged on a route by conference ships are
controlled at the lower end by the least efficient carrier in the group.ll
The support of these inefficient carriers is at the expense of the shipper.
While one of the purposes of conferences is to prevent freight rate
wars, these wars still take place. In 1935, a freight war began between
the United States/South and East Africa Conference and the Seas Shipping
Company when the Seas Shipping Company was denied entry into the conference.
The company decided to stay in the trade, and reduced rates in order to
attract customers. The conference responded by reducing their rates,and
thus started a rate war which lasted for two years. In the mid 1960's,
the introduction of container vessels in the Pacific also caused spiral
rate cutting. The competitiveness created there, by the addition of new
technology, nearly destroyed the conference system in that region. 12
One other complaint frequently voiced involves the use of deferred
rebates. While many shipping companies believe the deferred rebate to be
the most effective device available to control trade,13 some shippers
believe that the tie is too strong. Accompanying the hesitancy to loose
two periods' worth of deferred rebate monies is the fear of retaliation
from shipowners for "disloyalty". The retaliation takes the form of
refusing space aboard the conference carriers when requested, making it
very difficult for the shippers to meet their obligations.
Although there have been many arguments raised, pro and con, regard-
17
ing shipping conferences (and even official investigations) over the last
100 years, the liner shipping industry has taken to this operating format
with verve. The reason for this perseverence may well be that in a high-
ly competitive, multi-national industry like the liner shipping industry,
"cooperation might provide a better answer than competition." 14
18
CHAPTER IV
Political and Technological Changes in the Liner Industry
Although many of the basic conditions and ideas concerning the liner
shipping industry have not changed in the last 100 years, there have been
some political and technological changes that bear some consideration. Two
major political changes that have occurred in recent years are the UNCTAD
Convention on a Code of Conduct for Liner Conferences and the Shipping Act
of 1984. The technological advances that have occurred in the last 30
years are overwhelming and the application of many of these technologies in
the liner shipping industry has brought about some significant changes.
Some of these political and technological changes will be discussed in this
chapter.
Political Changes: Until the early 1970's, the "handsoff" approach to the
liner industry adopted by many maritime nations, and the rules of operation
on U.S. trade routes set forth in the Shipping Act of 1916, persisted
fairly well intact. Around that time, however, the ststus quo began to be
upset. On the international scene, third world nations who wished to
develop their own national flag liner industry as a method for economic dev-
elopment, began to insist on a larger share of the world's shipping traffic.
On the U.S. trade routes, the Shipping Act of 1916 was beginning to show
signs of wear. The courts were showing less enthusiasm for the anti-trust
exemption provisions, and new technological innovations not considered in
the Act, began to flood the liner market.
In 1964 the United Nations established the United Nations Conference
on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) to provide an international forum dedicat-
19
ed to helping less developed countries (LDC's) develop their economies.
Shipping should not be considered as just another industry, but as an
industry vital to the national security and economic development of
these LDC's. The development of a strong merchant marine has a very pos-
sitive effect on the country's balence of payments. By providing services
abroad, foreign currency is brought in; and by shipping their own goods,
their currency stays home. Funds from these savings can be invested in
other development ventures. Up to that point the developed nations
dominated the shipping world, mainly because the industry's structure had
been developed before the emergence of the third world nstions and little
serious consideration was given to the needs of ~he LDC's. This appeared
to be a very unbalanced approach considering in 1976 the LDC's exported
60.4% in weight of the worlds export cargoes and imported 17.7% of the
worlds import cargoes,l but carried only 9% 2 Yet because of the old
colonial ties, closed conferences operating on the trade routes, and
loyalty sgreements economically difficult to get out of, the existing
conferences were able to dominate the movement of general cargo to and
from these LDC's. Their clout was strong enough to limit much of
the competition and shipping alternatives available to the shipper. 3
The LDC's had three major complaints about the system as it was.
First, they believed that the western-dominated conferences change their
rates and services without adequate consultation with the shipper, or
without consideration of the market effect that these changes would have
on the shipper. These fragile economies rely heavily on export dollars
(frequently from only one commodity), and changes in the rates and services
could substantially damage or hinder their ability to compete in the
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market. Second, the LDC's have frequently been denied membership to the
shipping conferences. Denial was often based on rationalization (where
conferences provide only what vessels and services are required, eliminates
wasteful competition). On the rare occasion when an LDC applicant was
given membership, share of the traffic was so small that it was often
uneconomical to continue operating. Third, typical arrangements made
between the shipper and receiver gave the developed nation the choice of
carriers. As the western concerns frequently chose their own ships to
contract with, this restricted the developement of the LDC's national-flag
liner shipping industry. To nations which desire to develop that industry
in order to become more self-reliant, as the LDC's do, this suppression
felt much like colonialism allover again.
UNCTAD Liner Code
In 1972, the third world nations of the UNCTAD requested that a code
of conduct for liner conferences be drafted to address these problems.
In 1974 the UNCTAD Convention a Code of Conduct for Liner Conferences was
adopted. The Liner Code addressed three major items: First, membership
to the conferences serving the foreign trade of a country would be a
right for the nations involved. 4 Under the terms of the Code, membership
to the conference could be limited to the trading nations and any
other cross trader whose participation could be rationalized in order to
protect the interests of conference members from destructive competition.
This right would only gain substsnce, however, if it were linked to the
Second item--cargo reservation. In the past, when liner companies of the
third world were admitted as members to conferences) their participation
was held to a minimum. The Liner Code gives the two nations involved in
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the trade each the right to carry up to 40% of the cargo traded, with the
remaining 20% left to competing cross-traders. 5 This rule, known as the
40-40-20 rule, would potentially guarantee enough cargo for the LDC to
develop its liner shipping industry, bring in more foreign currency, and
potentially develop and strengthen their economies. The third item, intend-
ed to counter the insensitivity of the carrier to the shipper's needs, was
that rules for rate and service setting be codified. Three of the most
important steps are:
1. A minimum of 15 months between rate changes,6 with a 150 day notice
given in advance of planned increases. 7
2. Shippers, shipping conferences, and shipper organizations, may
initiate mandatory consultative proceedings to resolve matters of
common interest. 8
3. All conference agreements must be made available to the shippers,
shippers organization, and to the appropriate governmental authorities of
countries being served by the conference .9
The Liner Code was enthusiastically greeted by the LDC's but with disdain
by the industrialized nations of the northern hemisphere (U.S., Great Britain,
and other northern European nations). The U.S. 's main objection to the Code
was that it was anti-competitive. Great Britain and the other Northern Euro-
pean nations were greatly concerned about the limits to cross-trade psrtici-
pation as much of their own involvement in the shipping industry is as cross
traders. Under this new scheme the Europeans could lose as much as $1.1
billion per year as cargo available for cross traders disappears. 10 Both
sides of the Atlantic saw the Liner Code as inefficient, and felt that
either freight rates would go up, service quality down, or both. The new
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liner companies would not be in a position to offer services and
rates on a par with what is now available.
Some of the European Economic Community (EEC) were concerned that
ignoring the LOC's concerns, and not ratifying the UNCTAD Liner Code,
would not make the problem disappear. The EEC, therefor, decided that
their members should sign the Code, but do so with reservations. These
reservations are called the "Brussels Package. "11 The reservations stated
that the Code would only apply between EEC members and developing states
and not between fellow EEC members, and the term "national shipping line"
would apply to shipping lines of other EEC states if the line is a member
of the conference. 12 This last reservation effectively modifies the
40-40-20 rule in the EEC-LDC trades to a 40-60 rule.
The Shipping Act of 1984
The enactment of the Shipping Act of 1984 is the second major political
change that has potential for effecting liner conference practices. Unlike
most other maritime nations that do not encourage governmental intervention
in liner shipping trade, the United States take a pro-regulatory stance.
Beginning with the Shipping Act of 1916, liner conferences operations on
the U.S. trade routes have been regulated by the federal government.
Conferences operating on the U.S. trade routes had to abide by the following
rules: 1.Conferences operating on the U.S. trade routes were required to be
"Open." This means that membership had to be open to any line that applied
for admission, with no consideration given to rationalization; 2. Rates
must be filed and approved of by the Federal Maritime Commission (FMC)
before going into effect;13 and 3. Practices such as deferred rebates,
fighting ships, and retaliation may not be used. 14 If a conference adhered
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to these rules, and the FMC approved the conference agreement, the conf-
erence agreement would be immune from prosecution under anti-trust laws. 15
Over the next 68 years, interpretation of the purpose and intent of the
Act, to encourage the liner industry's growth by providing anti-trust ex-
emption, became more and more distorted by the Anti-Trust Division in
the Department of Justice. In 1984, after eight years of debate, brought
on by a realization that the regulatory scheme imposed by the Shipping
Act of 1916 was no longer appropriate, a new shipping act was enacted--
the Shipping Act of 1984. The new act incorporated the following changes:
more anti-trust protection for liner operators, acknowledgement of, and
guidance for, intermodal operations. It also allowed for independent
action of conference members and encouraged the limited use of shippers'
associations as collective negotiating tools.
Under the 1916 Act, as interpreted by the courts and the FMC, in
order to receive anti-trust immunity, the burden of proof was on the
vessel owners to prove that a freight rate change was justified. If the
FMC found that the rate change or agreement was unfair, or detrimental to
the commerce of the United States, the FMC could prohibit the change from
coming into effect. Under the 1984 Act, it is up to the FMC to prove
that the agreement, or change, "is likely, by a reduction in competition,
to produce an unreasonably reduction in transportation service or an
unreasonable increase in transportation costs.,,16 The rate change agreement
filed would automatically become effective 45 days after filing with the
FMC 17 unless the commission requests additional documentary evidence in
the 45 day interim, or suit is brought in the U.S. District Court for the
District of Columbia to enjoin implementation of the agreement. 18
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Because the 1916 Act could not anticipate the intermodalization of
the transportation industry, the three regulating agencies (FMC, ICC
and the Dept of Justice) could not agree and come to terms on how to
regulate it. This lack of clear legal direction discouraged and the
industry, without sufficient capital, was unable to take full advantage
of this new development. So important was authority to contract intermodal
agreements, some observers believed that without it the conference
system would not survive. 19 In order that the recent development of
intermodal transportation not be hampered by overly restrictive laws, or
conservative law interpretation by the courts, the act definea legal
ratemaking practices that will enable companies involved in intermodalism
to establish clear anti-trust immunity.20
Under the new Act, conference agreements must allow its members the
right to act independently with regard to rate setting, in order to
attract customers as long as the other conference members are given a ten
day notice of the planned undercutting of the conference agreement. 2l
This is directly in line with the U.S. pro-competition stance. The
freedom that this section of the law allows, may encourage more independ-
ent carriers to join conferences. thus strengthening the conferences
system. It could also have the opposite effect as many liner companies
may see that portion of the act as voiding the cohesive bonds that are
necessary to hold conferences together.
Organization of small shippers into shippers associations is encouraged
in the Act. These Associations are groups of shippers that consolidate
their efforts, in negotiating, in order to gain a solid negotiative
stance during rate negotiations with carriers. They may also combine
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their freight in order to gain the prlme discount rates offered by carriers.
Although the 1984 Shipping Act does not grant anti-trust immunity to
these combines, it does make it illegal to refuse negotiations with them.
This is a step closer to pure market resolution to business disputes, and
away from governmental intervention.
In the Act, service contracts have also been recognized as being
legal. 22 These contracts, as described in Chapter II, are considered an
important business tool by the shippers and permit them to negotiate for
specific commitments with a carrier or conference.
Evaluation of Political Changes: It is important to summarize these two
legislative efforts by considering their impact 0 the world-wide liner
conference system. The UNCTAD Liner Code, which came into force in
October 1983, stresses cargo reservation and a more active role for
LOC's in the rate and provision making process. With a larger share of
the cargo traded on specific trade routes given to the LDCs, their votes
carry more leverage in the conference. This is a swing away from what
has been the status quo. The traditional maritime leaders, the western
industrialized nations, may now have to share their power with these
newly emerging nations whose business needs may vary from their own. The
passage of the Shipping Act of 1984 indicates that the U.S. government is
moving, if ever so slowly, in the direction of deregulation. This move
may help ease some of the international tension that has been the result
of the U.S. attempts to regulate foreign flag vessel operation. Even
with the lessening of governmental interference, the new act still attempts
to keep foreign companies in line by reserving the right to take action
if a carrier or foreign government "unduly impairs access" to cargo to
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U.S. Registered vessels. 23
In addition, the rapidly growing intermodal transportation industry
has been given the go-ahead signal by being given the same degree of
immunity from anti-trust as the straight ocean-shipping combines.
Technological Innovations In The Liner Industry
Within the last 30 years, technological advances in almost every field
and their adaptation to the shipping industry has brought about significant
changes. While economies of scale had been the driving economic force on
the industry for years, enhanced by construction techniques which allowed
larger and larger ships, the thrust now is "economy of systems.,,24 What
this entails is not larger and larger ships to drive unit costs down, but
more efficiently operated transportation systems to drive them down. To
utilize economies of systems, the industry has taken advantage of the
development of containerization, computers and energy conservation.
Containerization is the primary technological development, with
regards to shipping, in the last thirty years. Since Malcom McLean devel-
oped the container ship idea in the mid 50's, the method of cargo packaging
and handling has rapidly spread and is now being utilized on almost all
the liner trade routes. The extent of penetration of container shipping
into the liner shipping industry is evident as more than 50% of all
liner business 25 is now conducted by approximately 800 container vessels. 26
It is estimated that by the end of this decade, 75% of all liner cargo
(out of a possible 90%) will be containerized. 27 The operation of a
container vessel is one of the most efficient ways of transporting cargo.
Almost all available carrying space onboard a container vessel is utilized.
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Turnaround time, the time expended to on and off-load a vessel, is greatly
reduced (a well trained crane operator and crew can average 500 freight
tons moved per hour).28 A break bulk vessel twenty years ago might have
taken five days in turnaround time in a port; today, using a containerized
vessel, turnaround time can be as little as twenty four hours. The speed
of handling containers reduces the amount of time spent in port where
vessels are not earning revenues. Although not as efficient as container
vessels, Roll-on Roll-off (RoRo) and barge carrying vessels offer the
same type of economies of systems. Shippers have also benefited from
containerization, as it is a safe and environmentally secure way of
transporting cargo from the loading area straight through to the purchaser.
The advantages to containerization do not come without a price tag.
Although the operating expenses of a container vessel underway is compar-
able to a similar sized break bulk vessel, the overhead involved is
significantly higher. This overhead includes the cost of the container
vessel, the containers themselves, and special handling equipment. An
example of the cost difference is shown here: a 25,000 DW! break bulk
carrier in 1980 costE8,250,000, compared to a 25,000 DW! container
vessel, which in 1980 cost £29,200,000. 29 One must consider also that
liner companies must have a fleet of these vessels in order to maintain
services, not just one. Container vessel operators must also add the
cost of containers and handling equipment. The containers 1n 1977 cost
$3500 each 30 and the addition to the number of containers on board their
ship at anyone time. A considerable number of containers must also be
in staging areas awaiting packing or enroute to a vessel. The special
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cranes capable of lifting the containers from shore to ship at one end of
a voyage and off again at the other, costs upward of $1,750,000 each. 3l
Many terminals that handle container vessels have invested in more than
one such crane.
Currently the industry is pursuing the logical extension of the
containerization of cargo and intermodalism, and that is for one company
to organize and operate the land and sea transport of the containers. In
doing this, a single company can offer to shippers one contract of carriage
"which would adequately protect all parties concerned at any given moment
during the period the goods are in transit. ,,32 Both shippers and carriers
have become interested because of the reduced cost and complexity in
shipping through one continuous system. Large shippers, such as DuPont
who spends $740 million a year on transportation,33 are enthusiastic over
development of intermodal systems as they are always interested in reducing
transportation costs. 34 Shipping lines, such as American President Lines,
United States Lines, and Sea-Land have shown interest in developing this
system. Even ports, like the Portsof Long Beach and Los Angeles35 and the
Port of Seattle,36 are anticipating the growth of intermodal services and
are investing substantial amounts of capital into developing intermodal
container transfer facilities (ICTF). The capital outlay for such develop-
ment is into millions of dollars, but the potential for carrier and shipper to
save is tremendous. The Shipping Act of 1984 has encouraged the industry
in the U.S. to investigate development of this system in reducing antitrust
interference.
Computers now play an important role in liner shipping as well.
With the number of containers in the market today, it is a complicated
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•problem for owners of the containers to keep track of where they are.
Even the loading plan for one container vessel is a complex chore. In
both of these tasks, the computer is an ideal tool. Computers, with
their expanding capabilities are almost a necessity now, as shipping
companies analyze in depth data for economic studies, financial analysis,
and a other systematic appraisals.
In addition to the container boom sparking construction of new ves-
sels, so did the oil crisis in the early 1970's. With fuel oil leaping
in cost, serious consideration has had to be given to constructing newer
more efficient ships powered by diesel engines,37 or to convert the old
steam driven ships to diesel power. Either way, large amounts of capital
would be required. The effect that these technological innovations and
the rise in fuel costs have had on the liner industry was to demand high
capital investment by companies if they wished to stay competitive on a
trade route. Without the increased efficiency and reduced costs made
available to the shipper by the improved technology, a carrier would not
be able to capture the necessary cargo.
Summary
Changes in technology and political conditions are placing new
pressures on the shipping industry and the conference system.
On the political scene, the third world nations are demanding a
larger role in the world's business arena and this may be difficult for
the "old powers" of the shipping conferences in Northern Europe and the
U.S. to swallow. On the U.S. trade routes, operations have been effected
by the enactment of the Shipping Act of 1984, which is a step in the
direction of deregulating the shipping industry.
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Technological advances have been changing the face of the industry
as well. The advent of containerized cargo and intermodalism has had a
major impact on how the industry does business, as has the use of new
managerial tools like the computer. During the 1970's, the rapid rise of
fuel costs put such strain on shipping, that the emphasis was shifted
from fast ships over to more efficient ships.
These political and technological advances have changed the shape of
the liner industry. The liner companies willing to take advantage of the
opportunities created by the changes in politics, and willing to invest
capital and use the new technologies, will gain the competitive edge.
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CHAPTER V
Conferences Today and in the Future
The continuing use of shipping conferences by the liner shipping
industry as a mechanism for stabilizing rates and service schedules, and
as a negotiating tool with competitors and shippers has come into ques-
tions in view of the technological advances and international political
changes that have occurred over the last few years. Is the conference
system flexible and resilient enough to persist in an environment where
the third world nations gain increasing economic leverage and where
independent liner companies like Evergreen and United States Lines are
taking an increasingly larger share of the traffic away from the conference
lines. l
In the first chapter of this report, the conditions that lead to
the development of the shipping conference system were discussed. During
that time period, a technological boom was taking place, in particular,
the development of a faster, more efficient mode of transportation over
the seas--the steam powered vessel. This technological development was
quickly exploited and a tremendous amount of capital was invested, flood-
ing the market with these more cargo carrying space was available than
there was cargo to fill it. Competitors did what was needed to capture
this cargo--they cut prices. Thus began a downward spiral of rates that
continued to devastating proportions. The conditions then, that lead up
to the realization that inter-industry cooperation was the wisest tech-
nique for saving many of the participating companies from bankruptcy
were: 1. New technological developments which appeared desirable to both
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carriers and shippers as faster and more efficient; 2. High capital invest-
ment by carriers to take advantage of the new technology; and 3. A highly
competitive market caused by over tonnage leading to destructive rate
wars. The international nature of the liner industry made it difficult
to control any abuses in the industry.
Today, in the cargo liner industry the very same conditions exist.
Thirty years ago, Malcom McLean experimented with shipping general cargo
in containers. By mid 1960's, the idea of the containerization of cargo
had caught on and capital began to pore into developing purpose-built
container carrying vessels. From that first shipment of 58 containers
carried on a converted WWII T-2 tanker,2 the container industry has
developed at a phenomenal pace to where United States Lines is building
vessels that will carry 4,000 TEU's and Evergreen Lines is considering
vessels of 5-6000 TEU's.3 From containerization sprang intermodalism,
where a shipper can get nearly d~or to door service in transporting their
goods. As 15% of U.S. rail traffic is international in nature, and only
25% of that international cargo is currently utilizing intermodal systems,4
there is great potential in this intermodal service market. In order to
stay competitive in the liner industry) it 15 becoming more and more
likely that investment of large quantities of capital will be required.
Again, the new technologies have increased competitiveness on purchasing
larger and more modern ships in order to take advantage of the "economics
of systems". Even though an overcapacity of cargo space has existed on
most trade routes for the last decade, vessels are still being ordered
In fact, the world container fleet has doubled in numbers between 1976
and 1981. 6 With an overcapacity of cargo space available, it is not
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5
surprising that rate wars still exist. United States Lines primary
reason for building the 4000 TEU capable vessel is to cut slot costs,
drop prices and force their competitors under. 7
What can be seen, 100 years after the inception of shipping confer-
ences is that the same conditions exist now--technological advances,
high capital investment, a competitive market that could lead to de-
structive rate wars, and an arena where no single government can effect-
ively conrol the liners operations. Shipping conferences can still serve
this industry as an instrument for regulating competitors money them-
selves to prevent destructive rate wars, respond to competition from
"independents", and negotiate agreement with shipper associations and
competing trade routes.
This does not imply that the conferences will continue to operate
unmolested on their trade routes; there are some problems which they
will have to resolve or overcome. The three largest of these problems
are the LDC encroachment into the liner trades, the U.S. government's
intervention in the U.S. liner trades, and the giant independent lines and
state owned lines of the industry overrunning their competitors and
running the shipping business as they wish.
The third world nations have been trying to gain an econom1C foot-
•
hold since they began to emerge in the 1960's. One method of ensuring a
solid economy is through international trade. Many of the LDC wish to
gain more control over this international trade by developing their own
national-flag shipping lines. In order to facilitate this growth, it was
necessary to draft an international convention via the United Nations
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that would guarantee a portion of their cargo for their own vessels. This
document is the UNCTAD Liner Code. The code does not destroy the conf-
erence system, but attempts to change it by guaranteeing entry to nation
fleets into conferences serving their nation, and reserving up to 40 per-
cent of the cargo transported. Many of these national fleets are not
capable of transporting 40% of their trade, but the code will allow the
LOC's at least a chance of negotiating a compromise (within the conf-
erence) for a more equitable share of the trade route traffic.
The U.S. government's strict adherence to a free trade system and
to lIopen" conferences has caused some dissatisfaction with liner operators
and foreign nations. Since many maritime nations do not endorse competitive
measures within their shiping industry, U.S. flag operators must struggle
for their share of the cargo market. Without the rationalization and
pooling permissible in a "closed" conference, many investors see little
chance of decent return and therefore do not invest in the U.S. industry.
There are also many legal difficulties with enforcing our restrictive
standards on foreign fleets. Through the 1970's many industry officials
and legislators began to see the folly in operating against the current
with regards to the world shipping industry. The result was the Shipping
Act of 1984, which, although it does not allow "closed" conferences, has
given greater anti-trust immunity for liner operators. It is still
too early to see how the Department of Justice will handle this new
legislation but the Reagan Administration is leaning away from inter
ference. MarAd, in its 1978 report on the U.S. Merchant Marine stated
that the U.S. industry cannot survive where it operate under different
rules than its competitors and, that "free trade in the ocean shipping
35
is rapidly becoming a myth and national maritime policy should be based on
realism and economic self interest. IIB
Probably the greatest obstacle which the conference system must face
is the giant liner companies such as Evergreen, American President Lines,
and United States Lines which seriously threaten to destroy their competitors.
In response to this threat a new cooperative spirit is emerging in the
conferences, as is the understanding no line alone can compete with them.
Cooperation among the smaller liner companies is becoming viewed as the
only way to survive. 9 Competition is not yet crushed. Maersk Lines has
recently announced plans to start an intermodal service from the Far East
to the Pacific Northwest lO to compete with American Presidents' Lines. The
Barber Blue Sea and Maersk Lines and also a conglomerate of C.Y. Tung,
neptune Orient Lines and K Line are providing competition for Evergreen,
United States Lines on their Round-the-World service. So it appears that
the super-big shipping lines will not have an easy go at forcing all
their competitors off the market. Smaller liner companies will be able
to coordinate resistance against the major liner companies through the
use of conferences, especially since the Shipping Act of 1984 has increased
the anti-trust immunity for liner conference operations.
The conferences' purpose, then, of regulating competition among members,
responding to competition by independents, and negotiating with shipping
organizations has not disappeared and the necessity will probably become
even more intense as the new vessels like the United States Lines' Econoship
and intermodal systems of transportation come into bloom.
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